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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS APPLICABILITY
TO OSHA CIVIL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Stephen R. Cochellt
Historically, the exclusionary rule has been employed to prevent
the use of illegally obtained evidence to convict a criminal de-
fendant. In more recent years, inspections by administrative
agencies seeking to enforce government regulations has raised
thequestion of the exclusionary rule's app icability to civil pro-
ceedings. In this article the author traces the history of adminis-
trative searches and the development of the exclusionary rule,
placing OSHA proceedings in the context of both. The author
concludes that application of the rule will not promote deter-
rence of illegal agency conduct nor further the purposes for
which OSHA was formed, and in the alternative that a good
faith exception to the rule should be recognized
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress broadly stated that its purpose in enacting the Occupa-
tional, Safety and Health Act of 1970' (the Act) was "[to] assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and
healthful working conditions . *."..2 Pursuant to this objective the
Secretary of Labor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), adopted pre-existing "national consensus
standards" and other "established federal standards"3 and subse-
t B.A., University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 1972; M.S.W., University of
Maryland School of Social Work and Community Planning, 1975; J.D., Univer-
sity of Baltimore School of Law, 1978; LL.M. Candidate, Labor Law, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center, 1983; Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General
Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve. Lieutenant Cochell is currently serving with the
Navy Appellate Defense Division in Washington, D.C.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2. Id § 651(b).
3. The Act defines national consensus standards as including those occupational and
safety standards which have been: (1) adopted and promulgated by a recognized
standards-producing organization; (2) formulated in such a way as to allow con-
sideration of diverse views; and (3) designated a national consensus standard after
consultation with other appropriate federal agencies. Id § 652(9). In addition,
the Secretary of Labor is authorized to adopt national consensus standards with-
out rulemaking procedures as described in the Act. Id The term "established
federal standards" refers to standards previously established by other federal reg-
ulations or statutes. Id § 652(10). The congressional purpose behind adoption of
these pre-existing standards was to provide immediate protective coverage to
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quently promulgated new and more stringent guidelines for the protec-
tion of the American worker.4 To enable OSHA to enforce compliance
with these standards Congress passed a provision of the Act which au-
thorizes the Secretary to enter into private commercial premises for the
purpose of conducting inspections to ascertain the existence of safety
and health violations.5 These inspections proceed pursuant to either a
general administrative scheme for worksite inspections or upon filing of
an employee complaint of standards violations.6
The turbulent history of litigation and controversy surrounding
OSHA enforcement of safety standards has been attributed not only to
the haste with which many pre-existing standards were adopted7 but
also to the conffict generated by OSHA inspectors intruding into em-
ployers' once private workplaces. Predictably, employers challenged
these warrantless inspections on fourth amendment grounds.8 The
workers. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 517. See generally Rothstein, OSHA After Ten
Years.- A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as OSHA After Ten Years].
4. Virtually all-the new OSHA standards have been subjected to court challenge.
See, e.g., American Textile Mfg. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton
dust); Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States, 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1979)
(hyperbaric diving); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (asbestos); Dry Color Mfr's. Ass'n v. United States, 486 F.2d 98
(3d Cir. 1973) (carcinogens).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). This section states:
In order to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge, is authorized -
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory,
plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or envi-
ronment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at
other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions,
structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials
therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator,
agent or employee.
Id If the employer refuses admittance to the OSHA inspectors, the normal proce-
dure is for the OSHA official to return with a warrant. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6
(1982).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976). This section provides that any employee or a
representative of an employee may file a written complaint alleging violation of
an OSHA standard or alleging that an imminent danger exists. If the Secretary
determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe the violation or danger
exists, he is required to make a special inspection as soon as practicable. Id The
general administrative inspection scheme is performed pursuant to id § 657(a).
See supra note 5.
7. See OSHA After Ten Years, supra note 3, at 73-74. See generally Moran, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Standards as Federal Law: The Hazards of Haste, 15
WM. & MARY L. REV. 777 (1974).
8. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
19821 OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule
United States Supreme Court resolved this issue in lbarshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc.,9 holding that nonconsensual warrantless inspections are
prohibited by the fourth amendment."0 Although the Court in Bar-
low's resolved the narrow question of whether the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment applied in the OSHA context, the decision
generated a plethora of questions, including the standard of probable
cause to obtain a warrant, an employer's ability to resist entry despite
the existence of a warrant, the requirement of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and the application of the exclusionary rule to evi-
dence obtained from illegal OSHA inspections." Indeed, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)' 2 re-
cently held, in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co. , '3 that the exclusion-
ary rule applies to evidence obtained during illegal OSHA
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
10. Id at 325.
11. See Rader, Lewis, & Ehlke, OSHA Warrants and the Exhaustion Doctrine: May
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Rule on the Validity of
Federal Court Warrants, 84 DICK. L. REV. 567 (1980); Rothstein, OSHA Inspec-
tions after Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J. 63; Note, Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc.: Are Employer's Fourth Amendment Rights Protected, 16 CAL. W.L.
REV. 161 (1980).
12. OSHRC was established to adjudicate the validity of citations, penalties and
abatement orders issued by OSHA. If an employer wishes to contest a penalty or
abatement order he must notify the Secretary of Labor within 15 days, in which
event the abatement order is automatically stayed. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(a), (b),
666(d) (1976). An evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law
judge of OSHRC. At this hearing, the burden is on the Secretary to establish the
elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his proposed abatement
order and penalty. The judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all
of these items, giving due consideration in his penalty assessment to the size of the
business involved, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and
the history of previous violations. Id § 666(i). The judge's decision becomes
OSHRC's final and appealable order unless, within 30 days, a commissioner di-
rects that it be reviewed by the full Commission. Id §§ 659(c), 661(i), 666; see 29
C.F.R. §§ 2200.90-.91 (1982). The Commission consists of three members, ap-
pointed for six-year terms, each of whom is qualified "by reason of training, edu-
cation or experience" to adjudicate contested citations and assess penalties. 29
U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
If review is granted, the Commission's subsequent order directing abatement
and the payment of any assessed penalty becomes final unless the employer timely
petitions for judicial review in the appropriate federal court of appeals. Id
§ 660(a). The Secretary similarly may seek review of OSHRC orders but, in
either case, "[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be
conclusive." Id If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary
may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the
fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. Id§ 666(k). Thus, the penalty may be collected without the employer's ever being
entitled to a jury determination of the facts constituting the violations. See Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1977).
13. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, aff'd, 693 F.2d 1061 (1lth Cir. 1982).
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This article examines the Sarasota decision and the question of
whether the exclusionary rule is applicable to OSHA civil enforcement
proceedings. A discussion of the law of administrative searches is then
presented, followed by a precedential view and analysis of the purposes
and policies underlying the exclusionary rule. After placing OSHA
civil proceedings in the context of both the law of administrative
searches and that of the exclusionary rule, it is concluded that the rule
is inapplicable to OSHA because historically it has been limited to
cases involving criminal or quasi-criminal penalties. It is also argued
that the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to OSHA pro-
ceedings far outweigh its deterrent effect.' 5 Alternatively, it is sug-
gested that if the exclusionary rule is applied to OSHA proceedings, it
should not apply to fourth amendment violations committed in good
faith.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
With the growth of government and the routine delegation of leg-
islative authority to administrative bodies, in order to effectuate a
broad range of social goals including employee health and safety, ad-
ministrative inspections are a common tool for the agency charged with
enforcement of standards set by Congress. Intrusions by government
officials into traditionally private commercial areas have resulted in a
proliferation of fourth amendment litigation and a concomitant scru-
tiny of administrative actions by the courts.' 6 An understanding of the
law governing OSHA inspections may be gained by placing them in the
context of the general body of law surrounding the administrative
search.
In Frank v. Maryland, 1" one of the earlier cases involving an ad-
ministrative search, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's crimi-
nal conviction for refusal to permit a warrantless inspection of his
private home for rat infestation. In concluding that the search was not
violative of due process, the Court observed that the primary purpose
of the inspection was identification of a community health hazard
rather than pursuit of criminal evidence.' 8 Moreover, ample grounds
existed to support a warrantless entry into the premises in a reasonable
14. But see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
15. But see Trant, OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule.- Should the Employer Go Free
Because the Compliance Officer Has Blundered, 1981 DUKE L.J. 667 [hereinafter
cited as OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule].
16. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See generally Note, Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc..: Are Employer's Fourth Amendment Rights Protected, 16 CAL.
W.L. REV. 161 (1980); Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1291 (1979).
17. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
18. Id at 371-72.
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manner and at a reasonable time. Citing the need to maintain basic
minimal standards of housing and to prevent the spread of disease, the
Court held that Frank's privacy interests were, at most, on the "periph-
ery" of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion.' 9 This holding was correct in light of the long
standing scheme of regulatory enforcement for the general welfare dat-
ing back to colonial days.20
Subsequent cases, however, overruled that portion of Frank which
approved warrantless inspections. In the companion cases of Camara v.
Municipal Court2 ' and See v. City of Seattle,22 the Supreme Court held
that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment applied to ad-
ministrative searches of private and commercial dwellings. In Camara,
the lessee of a building refused to permit a warrantless inspection of a
portion of his leasehold by a housing inspector. 23 The Court held that
the lower courts erred in denying Camara's writ of prohibition, which
was based on the ground that San Francisco's Housing Code authoriz-
ing warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. The Court specifi-
cally rejected the Frank Court's assertion that administrative
inspections touched only the "periphery" of protected privacy inter-
ests.24 Paraphrasing a portion of Justice Douglas' dissent in Frank, the
Court stated that "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. ' 25 The
Court found that administrative searches involve a "significant intru-
sion" upon individual privacy interests and that the fourth amendment
requires that a warrant be based upon probable cause.26
The Court in Camara further held that, although the standard for
issuance of an administrative warrant was probable cause, the test in
the civil context is different from the test utilized for issuance of war-
rants to conduct a search for evidence of criminal violations.27 In test-
ing for administrative probable cause, the magistrate must balance the
governmental interest favoring intrusion against individual privacy in-
terests to determine whether a search is reasonable under the fourth
amendment.28 In its consideration of area code inspection programs,
19. Id at 367. But see Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam) (Justice Bren-
nan observed that Frank was "the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided
Court").
20. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
21. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
23. The purpose of the inspection was to determine if the lessee was residing in the
rear of the leasehold against housing regulations. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 526 (1967).
24. Id at 530.
25. Id (paraphrasing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
26. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
27. Id at 535.
28. Id at 534-37. But see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (a magistrate employs
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the Court concluded that programs primarily designed for the preven-
tion or abatement of dangerous housing or safety conditions were rea-
sonable by virtue of custom, the interest in public safety, and the fact
that such inspections were neither personal in nature nor utilized as a
search for evidence of criminal activity.29 Accordingly, administrative
probable cause to issue a warrant may be found to exist "if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspec-
tion are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."3 °
In See v. City of Seattle,31 a fire department inspector was refused
entry into a locked commercial warehouse by the owner while attempt-
ing to conduct a routine area inspection in compliance with Seattle's
Fire Code. The owner was prosecuted and convicted under the local
ordinance requiring access to buildings. In reversing the conviction the
Supreme Court reiterated its view that area code inspections are an
important tool for regulatory enforcement, but held that private com-
mercial businesses are entitled to the same fourth amendment protec-
tions against administrative inspections as are private dwellings. 2
"The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitu-
tional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official en-
tries upon his private commercial property. 33
The viability of the Camara and See decisions prohibiting war-
rantless administrative inspections was apparently undercut by two
subsequent rulings in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States34 and
United States v. Biswell.35 In Colonnade, the Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless inspection of the commercial premises of a licensed liquor
dealer conducted under a federal statute authorizing inspections to as-
certain compliance with licensing laws.36 The Court distinguished the
Camara-See warrant requirement by virtue of the long history of gov-
ernmental regulation of the liquor industry predating the fourth
amendment and the broad latitude afforded Congress to design inspec-
tion laws to "meet the evils at hand. 37
Similarly, in Biswell, the Supreme Court held that Congress could
authorize warrantless searches of licensed firearms dealers.3 8  The
no balancing test in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant
to search for criminal activity. Rather, the magistrate makes a disinterested deter-
mination based on the facts before him and inferences logically drawn therefrom
that probable cause exists).
29. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
30. Id at 538.
31. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
32. Id at 545-46; see also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) (holding that commercial premises are entitled to the same fourth amend-
ment protection as private residential dwellings).
33. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
34. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
35. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
36. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970).
37. Id at 76.
38. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313, 316 (1972).
[Vol. 12
OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule
Court reasoned that warrantless inspections are an important part of
regulatory schemes because they assure that weapons are properly dis-
tributed and controlled.3 9 The Court noted that while periodic inspec-
tions were sufficient in See to determine building code violations, the
governmental regulatory scheme for controlling firearms requires
unannounced, warrantless inspections to serve as a deterrent to viola-
tions.' "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated
business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge
that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to
effective regulations. '
4
'
The apparent erosion of the Camara-See approach arguably came
to a halt in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,42 where the Supreme
Court specifically reaffirmed its decision in Camara and held that the
warrantless, forced entry by IRS agents into a private office for seizure
of books and records fell outside the Colonnade-Biswell exceptions.
The Court stated that neither the history of the common law, the Bill of
Rights, nor subsequent case law justified the creation of a broad excep-
tion to the warrant requirement in furtherance of tax enforcement.43
Against this backdrop of evolving law, Congress enacted section
657(a) of the Act." The constitutional challenge to the warrantless in-
spections that were authorized by section 657(a) was resolved in the
landmark case of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 45 In Barlow's an OSHA
inspector requested permission to conduct a routine inspection of the
work area in the defendant's electrical and plumbing plant to insure
compliance with safety and health regulations. Barlow, when informed
that the inspector did not possess a search warrant, refused to admit
him. Pursuant to regulation,' OSHA petitioned the Idaho federal dis-
trict court to issue an order compelling Barlow to admit the inspector.
The company sought and obtained injunctive relief against the
warrantless search.47 On appeal to the Supreme Court, OSHA posited
three arguments favoring warrantless OSHA inspections. First, it as-
serted that warrantless inspections to enforce standards promulgated
under the Act were reasonable under the fourth amendment because
Congress authorized such inspections to enforce compliance with those
39. Id at 315-16.
40. Id at 315.
41. Id
42. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
43. Id. at 354-55; see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (holding that fire
inspectors must secure a warrant to inspect private premises subsequent to a fire).
But cf. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974)
(warrantless entry into outdoor premises to conduct air quality test of smoke
fumes held permissible under "openfields" exception).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of this section.
45. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
46. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1982) (section unchanged since time it was considered by
court).
47. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 310 (1978).
19821
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standards.4" Second, OSHA argued that the inspections fell within the
recognized Colonnade-Biswell exception since industries and businesses
within OSHA's jurisdiction were "pervasively regulated"49 industries
"long subject to close supervision and inspection."50 Finally, OSHA
argued that a warrant requirement would impose a serious burden on
the inspection system as it would deprive OSHA of the advantage of
surprise.51
In a five to three majority, the Supreme Court rejected these argu-
ments and held that the fourth amendment protects places of business
as well as residences. 2 As in Camara, warrantless searches were held
to be generally unreasonable unless they fell within the recognized ex-
ceptions enunciated in Colonnade and Biswell The Court rejected the
government's argument that all businesses involved in interstate com-
merce are subject to the "pervasive regulation" and "close supervision"
which implies a consent to warrantless OSHA inspections.53
The Court similarly disposed of OSHA's claim that a warrant re-
quirement would seriously hamper its enforcement efforts by depriving
OSHA inspectors of the element of surprise, because OSHA's own reg-
ulations had the same practical effect. 4 The Court also stated its belief
that the majority of businessmen would consent to inspections without
a warrant, and absent hard evidence of any widespread pattern of em-
ployer refusal to consent the Court would not consider the issue.55 Al-
ternatively, the Court stated that OSHA could promulgate regulations
authorizing the use of ex parte warrants to inspect businesses without
48. Id at 311.
49. Id at 313 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
50. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (quoting Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)).
51. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978).
52. Id at 312.
53. OSHA argued that the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, which set minimum wages and
hours, supported the conclusion that all businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce were subject to close supervision of employee safety and health conditions.
See 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976). The Court specifically found, however, that fed-
eral regulation of hours and wages did not approach the degree of specificity and
pervasiveness required under the Colonnade-Biswell exception. Marshall v. Bar-
low's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 314 (1978).
54. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1978). OSHA's regulations pro-
vide that upon refusal by an employer to permit entry by OSHA inspectors, the
inspector should report to his supervisor who shall "promptly take appropriate
action, including compulsory process if necessary." See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6
(1982). The Court indicated that the OSHA regulation appeared to give the em-
ployer the type of notice which precluded surprise inspections. "If this safeguard
endangers the efficient administration of OSHA, the Secretary should never have
adopted it, particularly when the Act does not require it." Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 319 (1978).
55. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978). In a footnote, the Court
indicated that if inspection efforts were hampered by the emergence of a pattern
of refusal to consent, then the Court would seriously consider impairment of the
inspection scheme as a factor in balancing the need for inspection versus the em-
ployer's privacy interests. Id at 316 n. 11.
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prior notice if surprise was important to the inspection scheme.56
While holding that the warrant requirement does apply to noncon-
sensual OSHA inspections, the Court in Barlow's adopted the Camara
test of probable cause for administrative search warrants rather than
the criminal law standard.57 The Court reasoned that the warrant re-
quirement is necessary to protect employers from the unbridled discre-
tion that the Act delegates to administrators in deciding who and when
to search. 58 A neutral magistrate may assure that the search is reason-
56. 1d. at 310 n.15. OSHA promptly promulgated regulations authorizing ex parte
warrants. These regulations were challenged and a district court judge issued a
preliminary injunction requiring OSHA to afford an employer notice prior to ap-
plication for issuance of a warrant. Electing not to appeal, OSHA attempted to
evade the impact of the order by issuing an "interpretation" of the earlier regula-
tion and moving to dissolve the preliminary injunction. On appeal of the trial
court's denial of the OSHA motion, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's
rulings on the ground that OSHA failed to provide notice and comment prior to
rulemaking. Cerro Metal Prod. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). OSHA
subsequently issued a rule, after proper notice and comment, authorizing issuance
of ex parte warrants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1982).
57. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978). The Court stated that prob-
able cause:
may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but
also on a showing that reasonable legislative standards for conducting an
. . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the en-
forcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as . . . disper-
sion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and
the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the
area, would protect an employer's [flourth [a]mendment right.
Id. at 320-21.
58. Id One commentator correctly observed that the Court in Bar/ow's deleted the
modifier "area" preceding the term inspection in the Camara standard. Since the
Camara Court contemplated health inspections encompassing large areas at a
time, the Barlow's Court by deletion of the term "area" has narrowed the scope of
a "reasonable" inspection. Within the same passage, the Court also deleted the
term "dwelling" and substituted "establishment," thus broadening the protections
afforded. See Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc..: Are Employer's Fourth Amendment
Rights Protected?, 16 CAL. W.L. REV. 161, 177 (1980).
Subsequent to the Barlow's decision, the Supreme Court was confronted with
an administrative inspection scheme that was superficially similar to that embod-
ied in section 657(a) of the Act. In Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the
warrantless inspection provision of the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30
U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), was upheld in the face of claims that such
inspections were unreasonable searches prohibited by the fourth amendment.
Unlike the OSHA inspection scheme, which covers a broad spectrum of all indus-
tries and businesses engaged in or affecting commerce, the MSHA regulatory
scheme covers only the mining industry and carefully delineates the purpose, fre-
quency and scope of mine inspections. In pertinent part, the statutory provisions
of MSHA require mine inspectors to conduct inspections of all surface mines at
least twice annually and all underground mines four times annually, in addition
to requiring follow-up inspections of mines where previous violations were dis-
covered. Id Moreover, MSHA requires inspections of mining operations generat-
ing explosive gases at irregular 5-, 10-, or 15-day intervals. Id § 813(i).
The Court felt that this inspection program fell within the ambit of the Colon-
nade-Biswell exception because the frequency and regularity of mine inspections
Baltimore Law Review
able under the Constitution, authorized by statute, and conducted pur-
suant to a plan containing specific criteria.59 Moreover, a warrant
serves to delineate the object and scope of the intrusion permitted
OSHA in conducting the inspection.6"
The Court in Barlow's settled the issue of whether the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment applied to OSHA inspections and
offered general guidance in determining probable cause for authorizing
inspections. The Court, however, did not determine the judicial sanc-
tions for noncompliance with the fourth amendment warrant
requirement.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Prior to a determination of whether the exclusionary rule should
be applied in an administrative proceeding, it is important to place the
rule in its historical context. The Supreme Court fashioned the exclu-
sionary rule in the seminal case of Weeks v. United States6 when it
reversed a conviction for illegal use of the mails to transmit lottery tick-
ets. The conviction was based on a warrantless search and seizure of
papers and letters found in Week's home. The primary concern of the
Court in Weeks was the potential involvement by the judiciary in un-
constitutional behavior by permitting illegally obtained evidence to
come before the courts. "To sanction such proceedings would be to
affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of
the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action."6" The Court reasoned that if
letters and other documents could be seized without authority, the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment are of no value, and "might as well
be stricken from the Constitution."63 Thus, the Court refused to place
constitutes the type of pervasive regulation that was lacking in OSHA's scheme.
The critical determinant in upholding the reasonableness of MSHA's inspection
scheme, as contrasted to OSHA's, turned on the fact that "rather than leaving the
frequency and scope of inspections to the unchecked discretion of government
officers, [MSHA] establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory pres-
ence." Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604 (1981). In balancing the fourth
amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches with the substantial fed-
eral interests in improving the health and safety conditions of the nation's mines,
the Court concluded that the certainty and regularity of the inspection scheme
provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Id at 602-06.
59. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
60. Id
61. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62. Id at 394.
63. Id at 393. The Court further stated that:
The efforts of the .courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punish-
ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.
Id; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (Court held, in dictum,
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its judicial imprimatur on illegal police conduct.64
It was not until 1961 that the Court held, in Mapp v. Ohio,65 that
the exclusionary rule is constitutionally compelled under the fourth
amendment and therefore applicable to the states.66 Because the right
of privacy is an essential ingredient of the fourth amendment, the
Court in Mapp held that states must exclude illegally seized evidence.
"To hold otherwise is to grant the right, but in reality, to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment."67 The Court then reiterated a conclusion it
had reached the previous year in Elkins v. United States."68 that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter constitutional violations by
removing the incentives for official misconduct. 69 Thus, the Court pre-
mised its decision in Mapp on dual grounds: the fourth amendment
right to privacy and the need for deterrence of malfeasance.
In Linkletter v. Walker, 70 the Court retreated from its constitu-
tional interpretation that required application of the exclusionary rule.
Faced with the troublesome question of whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied retroactively to convictions finalized prior to Mapp,
the Court sub silentio held that Mapp was not premised on independ-
ent fourth amendment grounds but was a function of the need for de-
terrence of police misconduct.7 '
Since Linkletter, the Court has consistently articulated the deter-
rent theory as its principal purpose for exclusion of unconstitutionally
acquired evidence. 72 In Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents 73 it be-
that to force the defendant in a forfeiture proceeding to produce documents was
unconstitutional).
64. See generally OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 14, at 674-75. In Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), however, the Court refused to extend the exclu-
sionary rule in Weeks to the states since "[Weeks] was not derived from the ex-
plicit requirements of the fourth amendment; it was not based on legislation
expressing congressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The deci-
sion was a matter of judicial implication." Id at 28. Even though the Court held
the fourth amendment inapplicable to the states, use of the exclusionary rule was
not considered the only sanction which would satisfy the minimal standards as-
sured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 31. Com-
mon law damage actions and penal sanctions were available against police
officials who transgressed the law. Id at 30-31 n. 1.
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. Id at 655-57.
67. Id at 656.
68. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
69. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
70. 381 U.S. 618 (1966).
71. Id. at 620. It is apparent that the Court's decision in Linkletter was a result-ori-
ented decision designed to avoid the retroactive application of Mapp to numerous
state defendants seeking a rehearing on evidentiary matters. Id at 636-37. The
vast implications of finding the exclusionary rule to be based on independent
fourth amendment grounds apparently influenced the Court to adopt deterrence
as its primary goal in adhering to the exclusionary rule. Accord OSHA and the
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 14, at 684-85.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). But cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the
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came apparent, however, that the Burger Court would narrowly con-
strue the exclusionary rule and seek to limit its application. While the
Court permitted a cause of action under the fourth amendment for
damages resulting from a warrantless entry of petitioner's home, Chief
Justice Burger, in dissent, attacked the exclusionary rule as "an anoma-
lous and ineffective mechanism with which to regulate law enforce-
ment."74 Aside from the criticism that the exclusionary rule had failed
to deter deliberate fourth amendment violations, the Chief Justice as-
sailed the fact that the rule was applied with equal force to both
flagrant and inadvertent violations." Chief Justice Burger did not sug-
gest, however, that the exclusionary rule be abandoned. Instead, the
dissent recommended that the "capital punishment" of the exclusion-
ary rule be applied only to substantial constitutional violations based
upon a balancing of competing interests in presentation of truth and
deterrence of unlawful police conduct.7 6
In Michigan v. Tucker77 the Court began to tip the balance in favor
of admitting evidence obtained in technical violation of the fourth
amendment. The Court refused to suppress the identity of a witness
discovered during a pre-Miranda"8 interrogation when the defendant
was advised of his right to remain silent and right to counsel but not of
his right to court appointed counsel. The Court reemphasized its belief
that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate rights guaranteed by the fourth
Court held that the primary thrust of the exclusionary rule was deterrence, but
observed that "the rule also serves another vital function-'the imperative of judi-
cial integrity. . . .' Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not
be made a party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions." Id at
12-13 (citations omitted).
73. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
74. Id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id at 418.
76. Id at 419. Chief Justice Burger suggested a consideration of the proposed "sub-
stantial violation" test found in MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 558.02(2), at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1971). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 419, 425 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The question of
whether the exclusionary rule actually deters police misconduct is open. See Ca-
non, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police? 62
JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Kamisar, Does the Exclusionary Rule Affect Police Behav-
ior? 62 JUD. 70 (1978); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1970); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule.-
Have Proponents Proven That It Is .4 Deterrent to Police? 62 JUDICATURE 404
(1979); Spiotto, Search and Seizure. An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
andltsAlternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). The Supreme Court, in recog-
nizing the inability of social scientists to establish the effective impact of the exclu-
sionary rule, still adheres to the underlying assumption of the rule. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-93 (1976).
77. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
78. The defendant was arrested prior to the Court's decision in United States v. Mi-
randa, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The witness was a purported alibi witness whose testi-
mony at trial did not relate to matters adduced at the interrogation. Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974).
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amendment. The Court, however, concluded that the deterrence ra-
tionale does not apply when police officers conduct themselves in com-
plete good faith:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessar-
ily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the
very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defend-
ant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a
result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those par-
ticular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where
the official action was pursued in complete good faith, how-
ever, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.79
Because the police officers in Tucker observed the defendant's pre-Mi-
randa rights in good faith, the subsequent holding in United States v.
Miranda8 ° did not justify recourse to the exclusionary rule when the
goal of deterrence of willful or negligent police conduct could not be
achieved.8'
The Burger Court further advanced its support for a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in Michigan v. DeFippo 82 where the
Chief Justice, writing for the majority, declined to apply the exclusion-
ary rule to evidence seized in a good faith arrest pursuant to an ordi-
nance later declared unconstitutional.
[T]here was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was
or was not constitutional, and hence the conduct observed vi-
olated a presumptively valid ordinance. A prudent officer, in
the course of determining whether respondent had committed
an offense under all the circumstances shown by his record,
should not have been required to anticipate that a court
would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.8 3
The Court reasoned that police are charged to enforce laws unless or
until they are declared unconstitutional.84 It is not within the scope of
a police officer's duty to determine whether a particular ordinance is
unconstitutional unless a law is so "grossly and flagrantly unconstitu-
tional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see
79. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1974). Compare United States v. John-
son, 102 S.Ct. 2579 (1982) (retroactive application of rule required when police
conduct warrantless, nonconsensual invasion of suspect's home in order to effect a
routine felony arrest) with United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (retroac-
tive application of the exclusionary rule not required when border patrol agents
conducted a good faith border search pursuant to long-standing administrative
regulations and judicial approval).
82. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
83. Id at 37-38.
84. Id at 38.
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its flaws."85 Because the presumptively valid ordinance permitted ar-
rest under the circumstances and the evidence was discovered in a
search incident to arrest, the Court concluded that the subsequent in-
validation of the law did not undermine the validity of the arrest.86
Thus, the evidence was admissible.
The evolution of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
culminated in the controversial decision of the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Williams. 87 There the court, sitting en banc, announced its
adherence to the good faith exception:
[E]vidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule
when it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that
are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mis-
taken, belief that they are authorized. We do so because the
exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by
police, not reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for
the rule ceases, its app lcation must cease also. The costs to
society of applying the rule beyond the purposes it exists to
serve are simply too high - in this instance the release on the
public of a recidivist drug smuggler - with few or no offset-
ting benefits. We are persuaded that both reason and author-
ity support this conclusion.
88
As enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Williams, the good faith excep-
tion has two separate facets: (1) the technical violation; and (2) the
good faith mistake.89 The Williams court defined the technical viola-
tion facet of the good faith exception as including those actions taken
by police under statutes later declared unconstitutional or later con-
strued differently, provided the police officer's belief that the statute
was valid was both bona fide and reasonable. The Williams court em-
phasized that suppression of evidence would result if the officers can be
charged with knowledge that the search violated the fourth amendment
or that the law was obviously unconstitutional.9" Thus, the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applies to actions by police officers
which, while mistaken, are both reasonable and done in good faith.9
85. Id.
86. Id. at 40.
87. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
88. 622 F.2d at 840. (emphasis added).
89. Id at 841. See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment. The "Reasonable"
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
90. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 845 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per
curiam) (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
91. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 844 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); see also United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741 (1979) (the Court, noting that the IRS attempted good faith compliance
with their regulations, held that exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial was inap-
propriate since the violation of the regulations did not rise to a level requiring
application of the rule); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974) (exclu-
[Vol. 12
OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule
Although the court in Williams acknowledged that their decision
arguably undercuts the fourth amendment, it asserted that the holding
only narrowed the application of the exclusionary rule to its stated pur-
pose: deterrence of unreasonable or bad faith police conduct. 92 The
Williams court declined a mechanical application of the exclusionary
rule in those situations where the underlying policies of the fourth
amendment would not be served.
For here the cost of applying the rule is one paid in coin
minted from the very core of our fact-finding process, the cost
of holding trials at which the truth is deliberately and know-
ingly suppressed. . . . This is a high price indeed and one
that ought never to be paid where, in reason, no deterrence is
called for and none can in fact be had.93
Although the Williams decision has been criticized as both simplistic
and overbroad,94 it accurately reflects the direction and tone of the Bur-
ger Court.95
IV. OSHA AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A fourth amendment analysis of OSHA inspections involves two
distinct questions: first, whether a constitutional violation has occurred,
and second, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. Al-
though Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 96 resolved the first question, it did
not address the second. Subsequent litigation in the courts has pro-
duced a variety of results.
The Ninth Circuit, in Todd Shiyard Industries v. Secretary of La-
bor, 97 suggested that because the Supreme Court had never applied the
exclusionary rule in civil proceedings, the rule should not be applied in
OSHA hearings. 98 In Savina Home Industries Inc. v. Secretary of La-
bor,99 the Tenth Circuit reached, in dictum, the opposite conclusion.
Although confronted with the narrow question of whether a pre-Bar-
sionary rule not applied to deficient warrant when procedural error was technical
and exclusion would not serve deterrence as police acted in good faith), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
92. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 847 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
93. 622 F.2d at 847.
94. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule.-
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L. J. 365, 425 (1981).
95. Indeed, the Court in recently restoring a case to the calendar for reargument re-
quested the parties to address the question of modifying the exclusionary rule so
as to recognize the good faith exception in the context of a criminal proceeding.
See Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982) (No. 81-430). Inter-
estingly, the Court had earlier refused a request by the State of Illinois to argue
this very issue. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
97. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
98. Id at 689.
99. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
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low's search qualified for retroactive application of the exclusionary
rule, the court considered the question of whether the rule could apply
in a civil proceeding. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had
never so applied the exclusionary rule,' 0 the Savina court reasoned
that the Supreme Court had applied it in quasi-criminal proceedings. '0'
Finding the OSHA inspections and penalties quasi-criminal in charac-
ter, ' 0 2 the court assumed that the exclusionary rule would apply to ille-
gal inspections. "Certainly considerations of preserving judicial
integrity and deterring official lawlessness do not become inconsequen-
tial simply because an illegal search is conducted by the Department of
Labor instead of. . . the Department of Justice."' 1 3 While this broad
statement in Savina possesses superficial appeal, the court's characteri-
zation of OSHA proceedings as being quasi-criminal in character re-
quires closer scrutiny.
A. OSHA Penalties. Quasi-Criminal Sanctions?
The question of whether a statute is civil or quasi-criminal in char-
acter is ultimately one of statutory construction. '4 In Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 105 the Supreme Court held that a statute providing for
divestiture of citizenship for citizens leaving or remaining outside the
100. Id at 1362. (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)).
101. Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
102. But cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S.
442 (1977). In Atlas, the Fifth Circuit considered whether OSHA civil penalties
are quasi-criminal sanctions. The court held that OSHA penalties are civil in
nature and that imposition of such penalties does not entitle employers to a jury
trial under the seventh amendment. 518 F.2d at 1011. On appeal, the Supreme
Court did not expressly adopt or reject the functional analysis of the Fifth Circuit,
although it can be argued that the Court implicitly accepted the lower court's
analysis of the issue. See 430 U.S. at 449 n.5. Notably, the Tenth Circuit in
Savina did not comment on the Atlas decision in resurrecting the theory that
OSHA penalties are quasi-criminal. In fact, one commentator, in concluding that
OSHA penalties are quasi-criminal, also failed to address or distinguish Atlas in
his analysis. See OSH,4 and the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 14, at 692-707.
In Savina, the Court adopted the definition of "quasi-criminal" enumerated
in Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures. A Framework for Constitu-
tionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976). That definition states:
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in
form have sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme
Court. These laws, broadly speaking, provide for civil money penalties,
forfeitures of property, and the punitive imposition of various disabili-
ties, such as the loss of professional license or public employment.
Id at 381 (emphasis added). This article's analysis of monetary penalties, how-
ever, suggests that the severity of the penalty is important in determining whether
it is penal in nature. A penalty of $1,000 might or might not be severe depending
on the financial status of the individual law breaker.
103. Savina Homes Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir.
1979).
104. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,
237 (1972).
105. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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country to evade military service was punitive in character. 10 6 In so
doing, the Court in Mendoza-Martinez provided an analytical frame-
work for determining whether a statute is civil or criminal in nature.
The framework involves an examination of several factors: (1) whether
the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;' 0 7
(2) whether it historically has been regarded as a punishment;10 8
(3) whether it requires a finding of scienter; 0 9 (4) whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and de-
terrence;" 0 (5) whether the acts to which it applies are already crimi-
nal;"' (6) whether, rather than being a punishment, there is an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected; 1 2 and (7)
whether it appears excessive in light of the alternative purpose as-
106. Id at 168-69. Mendoza-Martinez departed the country in 1942 and remained in
Mexico until 1946 when he voluntarily returned to the United States and was
convicted of draft evasion. After serving a term in prison, he continued to reside
in the United States until 1953, when he was arrested for deportation under the
Nationality Act of 1940.
107. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (denial of a noncontrac-
tual government benefit); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (denial
of federal employment); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866) (ex-
clusion from practice of law in the courts of the United States).
108. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (imprisonment
and hard labor held to be punishment); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348,
350-52 (1886) (same); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-21 (1866)
(disqualification from lawful avocation as a clergyman held to be punishment).
109. See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922) (Court determined that
a tax on a business utilizing child labor constituted a penalty because the statute
used the criteria of wrongdoing. "Scienter is associated with penalties, not
taxes."); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903) (where punishment
differed according to whether carelessness or fraud was shown, a penalty existed).
110. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (statute taking away citizen-
ship from convicted army deserter serves no other legitimate purpose except pun-
ishment); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (because the tax
on those in violation of state law was grossly disproportionate to the normal tax,
the Court concluded that its primary purpose was punishment).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (state tax condi-
tioned on commission of a crime was penal in nature); United States v. LaFranca,
282 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1931) (same); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922)
(same).
112. See., e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157-60 (1960) (disqualification of ex-
felons from holding office in waterfront unions within regulatory power of State
to control union racketeering, not additional punishment); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612, 617 (1960) (disqualification of specific deportees from eligibility
for Social Security benefits while not lawfully in the country held to bear rational
relation to the purposes of statute and therefore was not a penalty); United States
v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1919) (provisions of Narcotic Drug Act for sub-
jecting the sale and distribution of drugs to official supervision and inspection
held to have a reasonable relation to enforcement of special tax on sale and distri-
bution of such drugs rather than punishment); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189, 191-93 (1898) (exclusion from practice of medicine following conviction for
felony held to be an incident of State's power to protect health and safety, not
additional punishment); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893)
(deportation held not to constitute punishment for a crime, rather it is a method
for returning aliens to their own country when they fail to comply with conditions
of residency). But see Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (tax is a
Baltimore Law Review
signed." 3 In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court examined the legislative
history of the Nationality Act of 1940 and determined that it was in-
tended to provide additional punishment for draft evaders who fled the
country during time of war. 1 4 Since the civil deportation procedures
utilized in Mendoza-Martinez lacked the procedural safeguards attend-
ing proceedings with a punitive object, the Nationality Act was held
unconstitutional. "15
Although the task of determining the penal nature of the statute in
Mendoza-Martinez was accomplished by reference to its legislative his-
tory, the task is not as simple in examining the nature of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act." 6 The congressional purpose underlying
promulgation of the Act is to assure workers safe and healthful condi-
tions and to encourage employers to reduce occupational and safety
hazards by providing for an effective inspection and enforcement pro-
gram.'' 7 The Act and its legislative history' 18 do not clearly disclose a
congressional intent to punish violators except when an employer will-
fully or repeatedly violates a health or safety standard and the violation
results in the death of an employee." 9 In this circumstance, the em-
ployer, upon conviction, may be "punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both . ...
Since this provision is clearly penal in character, application of the ex-
clusionary rule for violations of the fourth amendment may be
warranted.
As to the civil penalty provisions, however, an analysis of the Men-
doza-Martinez factors is required to determine whether the provisions
are in fact quasi-criminal and thus require the application of the exclu-
penalty when its primary function is to define and suppress crime rather than
provide for the support of the government).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (special excise tax
of $1,000 for retail liquor dealers in business contrary to state law, compared with
$25 excise tax for lawful dealers, held to be penal); Helwig v. United States, 188
U.S. 605, 610-12 (1903) (an additional duty imposed for undervalued customs
declaration greatly exceeded the maximum amount of regular duty and was,
therefore, a penalty). But see Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154
(1956) ($2,000 upheld as liquidated damages for fraudulent purchase of war sur-
plus goods when amount was not so unreasonable or excessive as to convert the
damages to a penalty).
114. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-74 (1963).
115. Id at 184-86; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that expatria-
tion under the Nationality Act of 1940, as punishment for military deserters in
time of war, was cruel and unusual and in violation of the eighth amendment).
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
117. Id. § 651(b)(1), (b)(10).
118. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5177.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976).
120. Id. Conviction under this section for a second offense may result in a fine of up to
$20,000, one year imprisonment, or both. Id Other criminal sanctions under the
Act include punishment for giving advance notice of an OSHA inspection, id (f),
and making false statements, reports or certifications in any record, plan or docu-
ment whose maintenance or filing is required under the plan. Id (g).
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sionary rule. Applying the first Mendoza-Martinez factor to the OSHA
statutory scheme, it is readily apparent that OSHA civil penalty provi-
sions for serious, nonserious,121 or repeated violations 22 of the Act may
result in an "affirmative disability or restraint," as defined in Mendoza-
Martinez, since employers are assessed a monetary penalty.
The question of whether the sanction has historically been re-
garded as punishment is easily resolved because civil monetary penal-
ties are not viewed as punitive when they serve a remedial rather than a
punitive function. 23 Although imposition of monetary penalties may
suggest a punitive purpose, one must examine the structure of the Act
to determine whether the primary purpose of the penalties is to impose
punishment for violation of the law or is remedial: that is, to encourage
compliance with health and safety regulations by providing negative
consequences for noncompliance. The Act provides for monetary pen-
alties of up to $1,000 per violation when employers are cited for serious
or nonserious violations of OSHA standards. 124 Repeated or willful
violations of the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 per viola-
tion. 125 From this statutory scheme, one may conclude that the Act's
purpose is primarily remedial in nature, encouraging corporate and
business employers to comply with health and safety standards by pro-
viding negative consequences for the initial failure to comply with the
statute and also by providing for the possibility of increased penalties
for repeated or willful refusal to rectify violations. While imposition of
the monetary penalty might be perceived as punishment for noncom-
pliance, such penalties are clearly incidental to the remedial purposes
of assuring "safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
121. Serious or nonserious violations of the Act may result in a civil penalty of up to
$1,000 for each violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), (c) (1976). Moreover, failure to
correct a violation for which a citation is issued may result in a fine of up to $1,000
per day as long as the failure or violation continues. Id (d).
122. A repeated or willful violation of the Act may result in a civil penalty of up to
$10,000 for each violation. 1d. (a).
123. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1001 (5th Cir. 1975), af'd, 430 U.S.
442 (1977). The remedial/punitive distinction was delineated in Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958). In that case, the Court stated:
[A] statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to
punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity as a
consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal
effect. The controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on the
...purpose of the legislature. The point may be illustrated by the situ-
ation of an ordinary felon. A person who commits a bank robbery, for
instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote. If, in the
exercise of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for
the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both dis-
abilities would be penal. But because the purpose of the latter statute is
to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is sus-
tained as a nonpenal exercise of power to regulate the franchise.
Id at 96-97.
124. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), (c) (1976).
125. Id (a).
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human resources."' 26
The scienter factor in the Mendoza-Martinez test cuts both for and
against a finding that OSHA penalties are quasi-criminal. In the case
of serious and nonserious violations, the Act only requires noncompli-
ance, not the existence of scienter prior to finding a violation. Al-
though willful violations may suggest a scienter requirement, the
definition of willfulness in the context of OSHA violations is not con-
cerned simply with malicious intent by the employer. Rather, the con-
cept of willfulness encompasses an omission or failure to act if done
voluntarily and intentionally. 27 One may conclude, therefore, that
OSHA penalties generally do not require scienter. 28
As to the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, testing whether the op-
eration of the statute will promote the traditional aims of punishment,
one must conclude that OSHA penalties are calculated to achieve both
a deterrent and retributive effect. The OSHA scheme assesses penalties
in accordance with the relative severity of the violation,129 indicating at
least a partial retributive purpose. In addition, the penalties may also
have a general deterrent effect not only on other employers within the
industry, but also on the offending employer. Similarly, OSHA abate-
ment and enforcement orders compel employers to change past behav-
ior and comply with established standards. The penalty and abatement
provisions, however, also further a remedial objective which serves to
protect workers by encouraging compliance with government regula-
tions. Therefore, under this factor OSHA penalties are not clearly
quasi-criminal in nature.
For example, in Alas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 130 the Fifth Circuit
held that OSHA penalties are civil in nature and imposition of them
does not entitle employers to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the
term remedial included the concept of compensatory deterrence and
also encompassed "a kind of prospective deterrence of a means to en-
courage compliance with the government regulation."'' On appeal,
the Supreme Court analyzed the issue in terms of whether adjudication
of OSHA civil penalties involved private rights which would entitle
126. See id § 65 1(b). Moreover, one must consider the relatively modest limits on the
penalties when one considers the financial resources of large corporate employers
and businesses who violate the prevailing standards. It should be acknowledged,
however, that such "modest" financial penalties can have a dramatically different
impact on the small business employer subject to OSHA standards.
127. See Kent Nowlin Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (voluntary
and intentional decision not to comply with OSHA standard was willful despite
lack of venal motive); F.X. Messina Const. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701 (1st
Cir. 1974) (same). But cf. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc., v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.
1974), afj-d, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975)(en banc) (more than mere voluntary
action or omission is required to constitute willful violation).
128. Cf. OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule, supra note 14, at 679 (OSHA penalties, with
possible exception of willful violations, do not require scienter).
129. See supra notes 121-22.
130. 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), aft'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
131. 518 F.2d at 1002; see also supra note 102.
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employers to a jury trial. In affirming the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that since the government was suing to enforcepublic rights
created by statute, an administrative adjudication, without a jury trial,
was not prohibited by the seventh amendment. 3 2 Thus, OSHA en-
forcement of public rights utilizing penalties performing both remedial
and prospective deterrence functions does not bring the OSHA statute
within the purview of being punishment-oriented.
An analysis of the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the pro-
scribed conduct is already a crime, militates against the proposition
that the OSHA enforcement scheme is quasi-criminal. In One Lot Em-
erald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, "I the Supreme Court
held that Congress can enact both criminal and civil sanctions for the
same conduct.' 34 In that case, a lower court's decision imposing forfei-
ture of illegally imported merchandise was upheld despite criminal ac-
quittal for the same conduct. Central to the Court's analysis was the
fact that proof under the forfeiture proceedings did not require a show-
ing of intent to defraud, an essential element under the criminal
charge. 135 The Court also reasoned that the forfeiture was intended to
aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations by providing for a form of
liquidated damages for violations of the law. Moreover, forfeiture also
served to defray the considerable expenses of investigation and
enforcement. 36
OSHA criminal sanctions for violations of the Act are clearly de-
nominated and do not overlap with civil penalty provisions. Section
666(a) provides for fines and imprisonment when an employer willfully
violates a standard or regulation that results in an employee's death. 37
Although section 666(a) provides for a civil penalty in those cases in-
volving willful and repeated violations, this provision does not run
afoul of the Court's analysis in One Lot Emerald because the criminal
sanctions of the Act do not apply unless the willful violation results in
132. 430 U.S. at 449-50. Cf. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-77 (1975) ($10,000
fine that resulted from a charge of criminal contempt did not trigger right to a jury
trial).
133. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
134. Id at 235-36.
135. Id But cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1955). In
that case the Supreme Court reversed a decision approving civil forfeiture of an
automobile which was utilized to transport contraband. Although the criminal
prosecution was dismissed because the evidence was seized in violation of the
fourth amendment, the state court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to
civil forfeiture proceedings. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that a forfeiture
proceeding is quasi-criminal in character because "its object, like a criminal pro-
ceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law." Id at
700. Unlike One Lot Emerald, the evidence necessary to sustain a forfeiture in
Plymouth Sedan required the same evidence which was illegally seized and ex-
cluded in the criminal proceedings. Since the forfeiture was clearly punishment
for a criminal offense, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied.
136. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237
(1972).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
19821
Baltimore Law Review
the death of an employee. Hence, the OSHA civil provisions do not
penalize behavior which is already a crime because evidence of a crimi-
nal violation requires proof of an additional element.
The sixth consideration under the Mendoza-Martinez test is
whether an alternative purpose other than punishment may be ration-
ally ascribed to the sanction. In setting forth this factor, the Court in
Mendoza-Martinez cited two prohibition-era cases to illustrate its
meaning. Both United States v. LaFranca'38 and Lipke v. Lederer'39
involved imposition of revenue "taxes" for possession and sale of li-
quor for which the defendants were criminally punished under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. In both cases, the Court was unwilling to accept
the government's position that the taxes were civil; instead, the Court
held that the only rational purpose behind the taxation of illegal liquor
under the National Prohibition Act was punishment of a crime.' 40
Similarly, in The Child Labor Tax Case, "4 the Court held that a
ten percent excise tax of net profits for violating child labor laws was a
penalty rather than a tax. In drawing a distinction between a tax and a
penalty, the Court observed:
Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the
legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of ob-
taining revenue from them and with the incidental motive of
discouraging them by making their continuance onerous.
They do not lose their character as taxes because of the inciden-
tal motive. But there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its char-
acter as such and becomes a mere penalty with the character-
istics of regulation and punishment.'42
Thus, in assessing whether a statute is quasi-criminal, a court is not
bound by the stated purpose ascribed by the legislature in promulgat-
ing the law. If the law is penal in effect, the courts will not hesitate to
reject the legislative label and find the law to be punitive.
The primary purpose of OSHA penalties is remedial rather than
punitive. The penalties are designed to effectuate the Act's objective of
providing safe and healthy working conditions and to preserve human
resources.143 While OSHA civil penalties may incidentally deter em-
ployers from future OSHA violations, or penalize them for failing to
comply in the first instance, the primary objectives of the Act do not
138. 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
139. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
140. See United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S.
557 (1922). In LaFranca, the Court stated that "[n]o mere exercise of the art of
lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of
calling it such." United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
141. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
142. Id at 38 (emphasis added).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
[Vol. 12
OSHA and the Exclusionary Rule
favor a characterization of the penalties as quasi-criminal within the
context of Mendoza-Martinez.
The final factor under the Mendoza-Martinez test is whether the
monetary penalty appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned to it. In Helwig v. United States, " the Court character-
ized a customs duty as penal because the statute authorized imposition
of an additional duty on the importer for undervaluating a customs
declaration. Although the undervaluation was made without intent to
defraud, the statute permitted an additional duty of over one-half of
the appraised value of the goods.' 45 The Court was similarly per-
suaded of the penal character of a statute when it was confronted with
a prohibition-era excise tax in United States v. Constantine. 146 The
Court in Constantine upheld the lower court's finding that an excise tax
was penal in character when the government exacted $1,000 from retail
liquor dealers engaged in business contrary to state law and a mere $25
from dealers operating within the law.'47 The great disparity between
excises collected for lawful versus unlawful operations strongly indi-
cated the statute's penal character. 48
Supreme Court precedent appears to support testing for penal
sanctions by looking to whether the monetary penalties are grossly dis-
proportionate to the statutory violation as found in Helwig and Con-
stantine. Because the Act imposes a maximum $1,000 penalty for
nonserious violations 49 there may be some instances when the penalty
is excessive in light of the violation. One might be cited for failure to
provide a proper toilet seat in restroom facilities and fined the same
amount for failure to maintain a safety guard on an industrial machine.
If presented with such an absurd disparity, a finding that the civil pen-
alty was penal in nature would be warranted.
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez, the
seven factor balancing test for determining whether a particular set of
civil sanctions are penal may point in "differing directions."' 50 Appli-
cation of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to a statutory scheme, while
relevant to a determination of its character, does not override the gen-
eral rule that courts will construe statutes by resort to their stated pur-
poses and legislative history.' 5' Several of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors, such as the nature of monetary penalties as an affirmative disa-
bility, traditional aims of punishment and excessiveness of penalties
144. 188 U.S. 605 (1903).
145. Id at 611.
146. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
147. Id at 295.
148. Id The Court in Constantine was also persuaded by the fact that the precondition
for imposition of the excise tax, illegal operation of a retail liquor business, in-
volved commission of a crime. Id
149. 29 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1976).
150. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
151. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430
U.S. 442 (1977).
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may, in some circumstances, favor the conclusion that OSHA monetary
penalties are penal. Viewed in its entirety, however, the OSHA scheme
focuses on the health and safety of the American worker, not the pun-
ishment of the employer. Although retribution and deterrence may be
achieved through imposition of a monetary penalty, such goals are in-
cidental to the Act's primary purpose. Civil penalties for regulatory
violations are simply a part of an employer's risk of engaging in a se-
lected enterprise. By imposing different sanctions in the Act, Congress
has clearly delineated illegal employer conduct which is criminal and
that which is civil. Additionally, the maximum civil monetary penal-
ties are not clearly excessive when compared with the stated legislative
purpose.
Thus, the Savina court's characterization of OSHA penalties as
quasi-criminal does not clearly fall within that category as defined by
the Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez. If the exclusionary rule is to
be applied to OSHA proceedings, it should be justified under a differ-
ent theory. The treatment by OSHRC in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete
Co., 152 of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule dis-
closes an attempt to justify adoption of the rule based on principles of
judicial integrity and deterrence of official misconduct. Closer exami-
nation of the Sarasota case is illustrative of the conflict and counter-
vailing policies underlying the decision to apply the exclusionary rule
to evidence obtained as a result of illegal OSHA inspections.
B. Sarasota Concrete Company
In Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., "I OSHRC applied the ex-
clusionary rule to evidence obtained pursuant to an OSHA inspection
warrant ruled to be overbroad in scope. OSHA received a complaint
from a former employee of the Sarasota Concrete Company regarding
alleged safety defects in the company's cement trucks. 54 Several weeks
subsequent to the complaint, an OSHA compliance officer requested
entry onto the premises for inspections. Pursuant to company policy,
he was refused entry without a search warrant.'"5 Six and one-half
months later, the area director of OSHA obtained an administrative
inspection warrant in Florida district court. Although the request for
the warrant was based solely on an employee complaint,'56 OSHA
152. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, aftd, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
153. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, afid, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
154. The Act makes provision for a special inspection upon written complaint by em-
ployees or their representative of: (1) a violation of a safety or health standard
which threatens physical harm; or (2) when an imminent danger exists. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(f)(1) (1976). It is notable that the statute does not define the terms inspec-
tion or special inspection but delegates the method of conducting inspections to
OSHA. See id (0(2); see also 29 C.F.R. 1903.11 (1982).
155. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,528, aft'd,
693 F.2d 1061 (lth Cir. 1982).
156. The complaint, in pertinent part, provided that "Sarasota has (12) driver-opera-
tors exposed to improper maintenance, i.e., worn tires, faulty springs, faulty turn
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made application for and received authorization to conduct a full-scope
inspection in accordance with OSHA guidelines existing at the time.
157
This type of inspection includes the employer's entire establishment. I'8
After the inspection, the company was issued a citation alleging twelve
nonserious violations of the Act. Significantly, none of the alleged vio-
lations related to the cement trucks or the substance of the employee
complaint, and no penalties were assessed. 159 The company filed a
timely notice of contest and the case came for hearing before an
OSHRC administrative law judge.
At the OSHRC hearing, the company raised a motion to suppress
all evidence of violations obtained by OSHA which exceeded the scope
of the employee complaint. The administrative law judge held that a
warrant issued pursuant to an employee complaint citing specific
hazards was insufficient to justify issuance of an authorization to con-
duct a full-scope inspection extending to areas not specifically men-
tioned in the complaint.' 60 OSHRC, agreeing with the administrative
law judge, distinguished inspections initiated at an employee request
and those based on a general administrative enforcement scheme.
OSHRC held that "where probable cause for an inspection is based
solely on specific evidence of an existing violation, to accomodate the
[flourth [a]mendment the inspection generally should be limited to the
alleged violative condition."'' 6'
Having determined that the evidence was obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment prohibition against overbroad search warrants,
OSHRC concluded that application of the exclusionary rule to the ille-
gally obtained evidence was appropriate and necessary to deter unlaw-
ful conduct on the part of OSHA officials. 62 OSHRC utilized a
balancing test in weighing the potential injury to enforcement of the
Act against the potential deterrence of future unlawful conduct by
signals and faulty lights and erratic brakes and steering on [a] major portion of the
cement-mixer truck fleet." Id
157. OSHA guidelines authorizing a full-scope inspection were published in OSHA
Program Directive #200-69, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY AND
HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11,137, at 12,142. These guidelines have been super-
seded by a new OSHA instruction providing that compliance inspections in low
hazard industries should be limited to the work conditions specified in the em-
ployee complaint unless the inspector observes serious hazards while conducting
the inspection or becomes aware of other information justifying an expansion of
the scope of the search. 29 C.F.R. § 1903 (1982).
158. See OSHA Program Directive #200-69, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY
AND HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11,137, at 12,143. When the complaint alleges seri-
ous hazards "if time and resources permit, the inspection should cover not only
violations and dangers but the entire establishment of the employer." Id
159. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, af 'd, 693
F.2d 1061, 1064 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
160. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) at 31,535-36.
161. Id
162. Id at 31,531-33. But cf. Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 695 F.2d
1020 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied en banc, Apr. 14, 1983 (suggests exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to OSHA proceedings). See supra note 230 for a further dis-
cussion of Federal Clearing.
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OSHA investigators.' 63 OSHA argued that application of the exclu-
sionary rule was unnecessary because OSHA inspectors did not utilize
coercion or force in effecting entry into the commercial premises.
64
Therefore, the need for deterrence provided by the exclusionary rule
was reduced in the context of an OSHA civil proceeding. It was also
argued that the exclusionary rule should not be applied in the civil con-
text when the government does not seek criminal sanctions but pursues
compliance with civil obligations. Rejecting both arguments, OSHRC
stated:
[W]e conclude that the Court's decision in Barlow's
stands for the proposition that an employer's right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures by OSHA inspectors is
a right that merits protection. The need for deterrence of un-
lawful government searches and seizures is similar regardless
of the civil or criminal characterization of the anticipated
penalties. To adopt the civil/criminal distinction suggested
y the Secretary would create the anomalous situation 'that a
man suspected of a crime has a right to protection against
search. . . without a warrant, [while] a man not suspected of
a crime has no such protection." 
65
OSHRC also held that application of the exclusionary rule would have
"an appreciable deterrent effect" on OSHA inspectors based on the fact
that the Secretary may issue and enforce guidelines to effectuate
OSHRC decisions regarding fourth amendment violations.
166
OSHRC also rejected the argument that illegally obtained evi-
dence of OSHA violations should not be suppressed if the official mis-
conduct falls into the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as
enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams. 167 With-
out analysis of the Williams decision, OSHRC concluded that "the ulti-
mate issue is not the Secretary's good faith, but whether the Secretary
lawfully obtained the evidence under the [flourth [a]mendment."'' 68
The Commission perceived OSHA as attempting to defend unconstitu-
163. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,531-33,
affid, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
164. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) at 31,531-33. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1982) (inspectors
are required to request permissive entry, and upon refusal withdraw to consult
supervisors with the option of obtaining a warrant).
165. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,532, aff'd,
693 F.2d. 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
166. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) at 31,532.
167. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
168. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,533, affd
693 F.2d 1061 (11 th Cir. 1982). The Commission dismissed the discussion of the
good faith exception in Williams as an alternative holding "of questionable prece-
dential value" because only "[tlwelve judges of a twenty-four judge panel
joined. . . ." 1981 O.S.H. DEC (CCH) at 31,533 n.10. A plain reading of the
Williams decision reveals, however, that the court was not speaking in dictum and
that thirteen judges joined in the majority opinion.
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tional inspections by the assertion that they executed the warrant in
good faith compliance with existing administrative guidelines, and that
any defect was a product of the magistrate's error. 169 OSHRC held,
therefore, that it is incumbent on the Secretary to limit the scope of the
warrant to the matters specified in the employee complaint or the in-
spection will be held invalid and the evidence obtained will be sup-
pressed in subsequent administrative proceedings. 7 ' Analysis of the
competing policies and values underlying the fourth amendment and
application of the exclusionary rule, however, suggest a contrary
conclusion.
C. Applicability of The Exclusionary Rule
In Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 171 OSHRC relied on the dis-
carded theory of judicial integrity 7 2 and deterrence of police miscon-
duct to reach its conclusion that the exclusionary rule applied to OSHA
proceedings. OSHRC also apparently accepted the dictum by the
Third Circuit in Babcock and Wilcox Co. v. Marshall'73 stating that
OSHRC could "decide, independently of any decision by the federal
courts as to the applicability of the exclusionary rule to administrative
proceedings, to apply the rule as a matter of its own policy pursuant to
its supervisory authority over the Act's enforcement. '
The notion that the supervisory power of federal courts extends to
suppression of otherwise admissible evidence illegally seized from a
third party not before the court was rejected by the Supreme Court in
169. OSHRC noted that the warrant in Sarasota paraphrased the language set forth in
the warrant application. Thus, OSHRC stated that "the Secretary cannot defend
against a charge of unconstitutional conduct by asserting that his officials executed
the warrant in good faith and that any defect was in the magistrate's error." Don-
ovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,533 (emphasis
added), a/f'd, 693 F.2d 1061 (1 1th Cir. 1982). OSHRC apparently did not appre-
ciate the distinction between execution of a search warrant and the good faith
belief in the existence of probable cause in applying for a search warrant. Such
distinction is critical in testing for probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The fact that the
language utilized by the magistrate in the warrant paraphrased that contained in
the application to search is irrelevant because the test for probable cause turns on
whether the warrant, standing alone, meets the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
170. Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, 31,533, a/f'd,
693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
171. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, af/'d, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
172. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). There it was stated: "the Court,
however, has established that the prime purpose of the [exclusionary] rule, if not
the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Id at 446 (citing
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). The Court in Janis criti-
cized United States v. Chase, 67-1 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) $ 15,733, 84,744 (1966),
in which the district court relied entirely upon principles of judicial integrity in
excluding from a tax proceeding evidence constitutionally seized by state agents.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457 n.34 (1976).
173. 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
174. Id at 1139.
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United States v. Payner. 175 The Court in Payner disapproved the sup-
pression of evidence when the defendant's own constitutional rights
were not violated because "unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede
unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. After all, it
is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial."' 76 Thus, the
Court concluded that the standard for imposition of the exclusionary
rule is identical whether courts elect to analyze the issue under their
supervisory power or under fourth amendment principles.'
77
While OSHRC may possess a type of supervisory authority, 78 it is
plain that it may not disregard the limitations of the statute it is
charged to enforce. 79 Since the Act does not explicitly authorize
OSHRC to promulgate rules of evidence not required by the Constitu-
tion, OSHRC's adoption of the exclusionary rule for purposes of ensur-
ing judicial integrity or in the exercise of its supervisory authority is
ultra vires.
Reliance by OSHRC on the theory of deterrence of police miscon-
duct to justify application of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained
by illegally conducted OSHA inspections is similarly misplaced. In
United States v. Calandra, 180 the Supreme Court, although speaking to
the narrower issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied to grand
jury proceedings, established the parameters for application of the rule:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule
has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in al[ proceedings or against all persons. As
with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served. The balancing process im-
175. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
176. Id at 734.
177. Id The Court observed that to allow use of the supervisory authority to suppress
gross illegalities not infringing a defendant's constitutional rights would permit
federal courts to exercise a "standardless discretion" in their application of the
exclusionary rule. Id at 737.
178. The Commission is authorized to promulgate -rules for the orderly transaction of
its own proceedings, 29 U.S.C. § 661(f) (1976), which are held for the purpose of
adjudication of contested citations. See id §§ 651(b)(3), 659(c), 661. The Com-
mission, pursuant to id. § 661(h), was granted the same investigatory powers as
that of the National Labor Relations Board. Id § 161. This gives the Commis-
sion the right to require, via subpoena, the attendance of witnesses for live testi-
mony. By regulation, OSHRC has adopted the rules of evidence applicable in the
federal district courts. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.72 (1982).
179. The supervisory authority of federal courts "is a complement, not a substitute, for
the [f]ourth [a]mendment. Application of the supervisory power is limited to situ-
ations where there has been a fraud upon the court in addition to a violation of
the defendant's rights." United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1216 (7th Cir.
1980); see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (federal supervisory
power does not give judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over law enforcement
practices of which it does not approve).
180. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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plicit in this approach is expressed in the contours of the
standing requirement. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusion-
ary rule has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of
the unlawful search. . . . This standing rule is premised on
a recognition that the need for deterrence and hence the ra-
tionale for excluding the evidence are strongest where the
Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of
a criminal sanction on the victim of the search. 8'
This analysis of standing applies with equal force to OSHA inspections.
If the primary purpose of the intrusion into an employer's premises is
to conduct a statutorily authorized inspection to ensure compliance
with existing health and safety regulations, rather than to discover evi-
dence of criminal violations, then a fortiori employers do not possess
standing to invoke the exclusionary sanction for violations of the fourth
amendment. Authority for this position may be found in Franks v. Del-
aware, 182 where the Court expressed "deep skepticism . . . as to the
wisdom of extending the exclusionary rule to collateral areas such as
civil or grand jury proceedings ... .""i3
Similarly, in United States v. Janis18 4 the Court declined applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to federal civil tax proceedings for evi-
dence obtained by state criminal law enforcement agents in good faith
reliance on a warrant which later proved to be defective. Citing Calan-
dra with approval, the Janis Court observed that "[imn the complex and
turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude
evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."' 85 In balancing the
need for deterrence of inter-sovereign violations of the fourth amend-
ment by criminal law enforcement officers against the societal cost of
exclusion, the Court concluded that extension of the rule was
unjustified.1 86
In a footnote, the Court in Janis acknowledged that some lower
federal courts had applied the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings.
1 87
181. Id at 348 (emphasis added); see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
182. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
183. Id at 171.
184. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
185. Id at 457.
186. Id. at 459-60. The Court also decided Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in the
same term as Janis. In Stone, the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to
claims of fourth amendment violations when the defendant was afforded an op-
portunity to fully and fairly litigate his fourth amendment claims in state court.
The Stone Court emphasized that despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclu-
sionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of all ille-
gally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. Id at 486. It was
observed that "although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity .
if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disre-
spect for the law and administration of justice." Id at 491.
187. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.30 (1976).
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Examination of the cases cited for that proposition, however, indicates
that they can be harmonized with the deterrence rationale underlying
the exclusionary rule. Of those cases cited, the Janis Court expressly
disapproved the reasoning of the tax court in Suarez v. Commis-
sioner. 188 In Suarez, the tax court applied the exclusionary rule to in-
ter-sovereign violations of the fourth amendment for the protection of
the individual and to preserve confidence in the processes of govern-
ment. 189 Because the tax court did not properly focus on the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule, the Janis Court refused to consider
the Suarez case as persuasive. 90
Pizzarello v. United States'9 I was also cited as support for the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. Pizzarello in-
volved an action by a taxpayer to enjoin collection of unpaid wagering
taxes on money illegally seized by Treasury agents. Although the Sec-
ond Circuit suppressed the illegally seized evidence, the value of Piz-
zarello as precedential support is doubtful because the evidence
suppressed was also evidence of criminal activity. 92 Similarly, in Pow-
ell v. Zuckert, 1 the exclusionary rule was applied in discharge pro-
ceedings of an Air Force civilian employee whose off-base home was
searched by American and Japanese law enforcement agents for illegal
possession of United States government property. 94 Pizzarello and
Powell can be harmonized with the standing requirement of Calandra
in that the civil proceedings followed illegal conduct by government
agents seeking to obtain evidence for imposition of criminal sanctions.
Thus, deterrence of police misconduct could be achieved by application
of the exclusionary sanction.
In Knoll Associates Inc. v. FTC, 19' an additional case cited by the
Janis Court, the same deterrence rationale was employed when the
FTC sought to enforce the Clayton Act by utilizing documents stolen
by an unfaithful employee of Knoll Associates. Because the larceny of
188. 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
189. Id. at 805-06.
190. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457 (1976). The Court specifically noted in
the text of their opinion that Suarez was not appealed. Id The Court also criti-
cized the failure of the tax court to distinguish between inter-sovereign and intra-
sovereign uses of unconstitutionally seized evidence. The Court indicated that the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule are best served when the punishment
of exclusion is imposed upon the law enforcement officers of the sovereign whose
criminal laws have been violated. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960). The deterrent purpose of exclusion is further "attenuated" when the pro-
ceeding is to "enforce only the civil law of the other sovereign." United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).
191. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969).
192. 408 F.2d at 581 n.4.
193. 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
194. Id at 639-41. Cf. United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1967)
(seizure of documents by Filipino agents held admissible since U.S. agents did not
request or participate in raid), a fd, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 960 (1969).
195. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
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the documents occurred with the knowledge of the FTC representa-
tives, for the express purpose of aiding them in their enforcement activ-
ity, the Seventh Circuit held that the exclusionary sanction applied. 96
Knoll is unique, however, in that it involved a flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment by regulatory agency officials seeking evidence of
purely civil misconduct. It may be argued that when, as in Knoll, gov-
ernment officials become accessories to a crime, the supervisory author-
ity of federal courts is properly exercised since there has been a willful
disobedience of the law resulting in a violation of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. 97
Thus, the line of cases cited in Janis 198 as supporting the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings may be harmonized
with the standing requirement for the rule's application. The compos-
ite view of these cases, in light of the purposes and policies underlying
the exclusionary rule, suggests an approach which excludes illegally ob-
tained evidence in civil proceedings: (1) when the search and seizure is
conducted by law enforcement officials searching for evidence of crimi-
nal activity; or (2) when government officials willfully commit, en-
courage, or knowingly acquiesce to commission of a crime in order to
obtain evidence of civil violations.
V. APPLYING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: THE
ARGUMENTS
In determining whether the exclusionary rule applies to OSHA
proceedings, it is apparent from the discussion of the rule and the anal-
196. Id at 535-36. Cf Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (holding that unso-
licited seizure of criminal evidence by a private citizen was not governmental ac-
tion and protections of fourth amendment were therefore inapplicable).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
198. Other cases noted by the Court as apparently supportive of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in civil proceedings included: Anderson v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp.
363 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (statements made by taxpayers after being subjected to illegal
search and seizure and custodial interrogation by police could not form basis for
jeopardy assessment by IRS); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968), affd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d
1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (illegally seized evidence in antitrust investigation may be
subject to suppression by defendant whose rights are violated unless independent
source can be established; question of whether rule applies in civil suits not
squarely addressed by court); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1966) (suppression of evidence warranted in tax assessment proceeding
when IRS agents conducted illegal search of taxpayer's home for evidence of
crime); Lasoffv. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (suppression of evidence
warranted when IRS agents conducted illegal search of taxpayer's home for evi-
dence of wagering); cf. United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal.
1967), afid, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (docu-
ments seized by Filipino law enforcement agents held admissible since U.S.
agents did not request raid or participate in seizure which would have violated
fourth amendment). Contra Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
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ysis of United States v. Janis9 9 and United States v. Calandra2" that
the Supreme Court will utilize a test which balances the government's
interest in admission of the evidence against the fourth amendment in-
terests violated.2 0 Sound arguments may be advanced on either side.
On one hand, employers may argue that Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 202
clearly held that the fourth amendment protected the workplace of em-
ployers against warrantless intrusions by government inspectors. In-
deed, the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches
was one of the root causes of the American revolution.0 3 If fourth
amendment interests of employers are to be adequately protected from
government inspectors, the exclusionary rule exists as the only realistic
deterrent since it will effectively deprive the government of the incen-
tive to violate the fourth amendment by depriving them of the use of
their ill-gotten gains. 2°
The government, on the other hand, may contend that standing to
apply the rule exists only when criminal or quasi-criminal punishment
will be imposed on the victim of the unconstitutional conduct. More-
over, the societal costs of applying the exclusionary rule far outweigh
the benefits of deterrence of official misconduct. Indeed, Congress en-
acted OSHA precisely because the lives of American workers were be-
ing needlessly lost as a result of unsafe and unhealthy workplaces.
Prior to passage of OSHA, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare reported that: ,
The problem of assuring safe and healthful workplaces . . .
ranks in importance with any that engages the national atten-
tion today . . . . 14,500 people are killed annually . . . as a
result of industrial accidents . . . . Vast resources that could
be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay work-
men's compensation benefits and medical expenses. 20 Z
To exclude probative and relevant evidence of employer health and
safety violations would frustrate congressional intent and jeopardize
the lives of workers who would otherwise receive the benefits afforded
by OSHA enforcement.
In balancing the competing interests at stake several factors need
to be examined. Initially, the "victim" of the unconstitutional conduct
199. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
200. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
201. Accord Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudica-
tory Proceedings, 66 IowA L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1981).
202. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
203. See Dickenson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, THE ERA OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40-75 (Morris ed. 1939).
204. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court stated: "The rule is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it." Id at 217. But see supra note 76.
205. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5177, 5178.
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should be identified. In the criminal context, the victim of an illegal
search is an individual whose liberty interests are endangered by the
illegal acquisition of evidence. In contrast, the corporate or small busi-
ness employer is a noncorporeal entity whose individual liberty is not
threatened by governmental action."0 6 Therefore, both are afforded
fourth amendment protection, but the exclusionary sanction should be
applied only when an individual's liberty or property interests are
placed in jeopardy.
The nature of the search and its situs should also be considered in
assessing the need for employer protection against fourth amendment
violations. The location of OSHA searches is the American workplace
and not the individual's home. While the Court in Barlow's made it
clear that workplaces are protected by the fourth amendment, its analy-
sis does not compel the conclusion that the exclusionary sanction
should be mechanically applied. A common sense application of
fourth amendment principles calls for a balancing of interests which
recognize that an individual's expectation of privacy in his person and
residence is entitled to greater constitutional protection than that of the
semi-public workplace.20 7 Moreover, OSHA inspection procedures do
not permit a forceful or surreptitious entry into the business premises,
but require application to the courts for a warrant or order.20 8 Such a
requirement does not exist in the criminal context where resisting a
properly served warrant will most certainly involve a physical encoun-
ter with law enforcement agents in search of criminal evidence which
can be easily concealed or destroyed.20 9
The final argument militating against a strict application of the
exclusionary rule in OSHA civil enforcement proceedings occurs when
OSHA officials seek and execute an administrative search warrant in
good faith. The fruits of the inspection should not be suppressed since
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule cannot be achieved by
excluding evidence which was acquired in the good faith belief that the
warrant was issued on probable cause.
A. The Good Faith Exception
If the courts reject the broad proposition that standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings does not exist absent a search
for evidence of criminal activity or a willful disobedience of the law by
206. In referring to liberty interests, one must distinguish between the liberty of an
individual against restraint or deprivation of his physical freedom and the liberty
interests of a business or corporation to pursue its legitimate business activities.
See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 483 (1978). See gener-
ally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "'Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411-16
(1977).
207. See Salvucci v. United States, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
208. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1982).
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976).
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government officials, serious consideration should be given to recogni-
tion of the good faith exception to the rule as delineated in United
States v. Williams. 210 OSHRC's position in Donovan v. Sarasota Con-
crete Co. 21 illustrates how the good faith exception would operate.
At the time of the Sarasota inspection, OSHA's administrative
guidelines permitted a full-scope inspection based on an employee
complaint,1 2 and courts which had considered the issue had reached
conflicting conclusions.213 Therefore, OSHA's inspectors obtained a
warrant in accordance with existing administrative guidelines that had
not been definitively struck down. Clearly, if officers or administrative
officials obtain a warrant in good faith and the warrant later proves
defective, the suppression of the evidence fails to preserve the legiti-
mate objective of deterring illegal conduct.
A policy argument against application of the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule for OSHA inspections can be made because all
nonconsensual searches are conducted after issuance of a warrant. In
Sarasota, OSHRC was concerned that the application for the warrant
and the warrant as issued were identical, thus raising the spectre of
magistrates "rubber-stamping" requests for search warrants from
OSHA inspectors without independently examining them. Indeed,
once the warrant is issued and the inspection conducted, good faith
could cover a multitude of constitutional "sins." Employers who wish
to attack the validity of a warrant would then be confronted with the
unenviable position of having to refuse the attempted entry by OSHA
inspectors and face contempt proceedings.214 If serious violations do
210. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). At least one court has held that the reasoning in Williams is "equally
applicable to civil OSHA enforcement proceedings." Robberson Steel Co. v.
OSHRC, 645 F.2d 22, 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
211. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, affid, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
212. See OSHA Program Directive #200-69, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY
AND HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11,137, at 12,142.
213. Compare Marshall v. Seaward Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Va. 1980), afid,
644 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding validity of full-scope inspection in re-
sponse to employee complaint) and In re J.R. Simplot Co., 640 F.2d 1134 (9th
Cir. 1981) (same) and Burkhart-Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625
F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980) (same) with Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d
320 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding, in part, that scope of employee complaint inspec-
tions should bear some relationship to violations alleged in complaint) and Mar-
shall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979) (same, in dictum).
214. Employers who have been recently inspected or who believe they are the target of
harassment may seek to enjoin the issuance of a warrant. In Dravo Corp. v. Mar-
shall, 5 O.S.H. CAS. (BNA) 2057 (1977), afl'dmem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978),
the employer was subjected to 24 inspections in seven years as compared to be-
tween one and three inspections for his competitors. Id at 2059 n.3. The Court in
Dravo rejected claims of selective and vindictive enforcement of the Act, since the
bulk of the inspection and enforcement activity was initiated not by OSHA but by
union employee complaints. Id at 2059. Other employers have raised claims of
harassment in a variety of circumstances with a variety of results. See, e.g., Mar-
shall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978) (information concern-
ing 1974 violations insufficient to establish probable cause to issue a warrant in
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exist within the workplace, or indeed, if the employer simply wishes to
exercise his fourth amendment rights against what is perceived to be an
unreasonable search, then his tactical position is greatly enhanced by
refusing entry to the inspector, moving to quash the warrant, and risk-
ing contempt proceedings if his motion to quash proves unsuccessful.215
If an employer permits the inspection, however, it is still possible to
attempt to protest an illegal inspection by seeking a court's injunction
of the enforcement activity. That option may be foreclosed, however,
by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 216 and the fact
that the evidence will not be suppressed even if the employer's claims
are successful on appeal. Thus, employers are encouraged to defy the
authority of federal courts to order inspection of their premises so that
they may preserve their constitutional claims.21 7
1977); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 452 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) (em-
ployee complaint merely paraphrasing regulations insufficient to establish prob-
able cause to issue a warrant), afl'd, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); Continental Can
Co. v. Marshall, 455 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (citations for violation of noise
level against each of plaintiff's 80 plants, had to be consolidated), aT'd, 603 F.2d
590 (2d Cir. 1979).
215. One commentator suggests this exact strategy and urges employers to adopt an
adversarial stance in virtually all dealings with OSHA inspectors. Moran, Em-
ployer Protection Against the Hazards of an OSHA Inspection, 1981 DIRECTION 25
(available from the National Moving and Storage Association).
This was a successful trial strategy in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978); see also Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co., 655 F.2d 793 (7th
Cir. 1981) (newspaper report of industrial accident coupled with five-year-old
OSHA citation does not constitute probable cause and employer's contempt con-
viction reversed); Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981) (failure
by OSHA to show existence of probable cause on basis of employee complaint
justified quashing warrant and dismissing contempt proceedings); Marshall v.
Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (probable cause did
exist for issuance of warrant, but as to contempt proceedings Rheinhold was not
in contempt because of good faith opposition to the order and obedience to a
subsequently issued administrative search warrant).
216. But cf. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 452 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) (issu-
ance of injunction prohibiting enforcement activity stemming from illegal inspec-
tion conducted under protest; exhaustion of administrative remedies not
required), afid, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally Rader, Lewis, &
Ehlke, OSHA Warrants and the Exhaustion Doctrine: May the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission Rule on the Validity of Federal Court War-
rants?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 567 (1980); Note, Exhaustion of.4Administrative Remedies
Required When Company Challenges Constitutionality of OSHA Inspection War-
rant, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 56 (1980).
This option, of obtaining an injunction to prevent enforcement activity, may
also be precluded if the courts apply the good faith exception in testing for irrepa-
rable injury. If the inspection was done in good faith and the evidence is admissi-
ble, no injury has been done to the employer.
217. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). In the context of the Mine Safety
and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), the Court held that mine
operators could protect special privacy interests by refusing entry to mine inspec-
tors. The inspectors are then required to file a civil action in federal court to
obtain an injunction against future refusals. Such a proceeding provides mine
owners with an adequate forum to show that a specific search was outside the
regulatory authority of the Act. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1981).
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Even though such arguments possess merit, it is questionable
whether they rise to a level requiring application of the exclusionary
rule. In making such difficult tactical decisions regarding their legal
position, employers are simply called upon to make a management de-
cision which entails a certain set of risks and adverse consequences.
Moreover, employers are not left completely defenseless against the
OSHA inspector. When faced with frequent general schedule inspec-
tions or numerous employee complaint inspections which indicate a
pattern of harassment or bad faith, the employer should give serious
consideration to refusing entry to OSHA inspectors.21 8 Similarly, if an
employer can demonstrate a pattern of abuse of the general regulatory
inspection scheme, a sympathetic court may be inclined to enjoin fur-
ther inspection and enforcement activities by OSHA.
B. A New Argument
One argument that has not been advanced against imposition of
the exclusionary sanction is that it is premature to apply the "capital
punishment" of the rule to OSHA inspections because of the relative
youth and "growing pains" of a regulatory program and agency estab-
lished only twelve years ago. Other options exist to resolve the
problems of unconstitutional inspections in the form of legislation 21 9 or
OSHA rulemaking.
Although widespread criticism has been leveled at OSHA for its
inspection procedures, the agency has recently indicated a responsive-
ness to those concerns. In February of 1982, OSHA promulgated com-
plaint processing procedures which will serve to eliminate the scope
218. One commentator has emphasized the importance of maintaining a cordial rela-
tionship between the employer and the OSHA inspector because of the "great
degree of administrative discretion" involved in the inspection, citation, penalty-
assessment and abatement functions performed by OSHA inspectors. Rothstein,
OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J. 63. Even so,
the author indicates that obvious abuses should not be tolerated by employers.
Id
219. The Occupational Safety and Health Improvements Acts of 1980, S. 2153, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. were introduced by Senator Schweiker and sought to amend the
Act by concentrating enforcement activities in high-hazard workplaces and by en-
couraging self-initiative in improving occupational safety and health. Although
the bill did not pass into law, OSHA subsequently changed inspection procedures
to parallel some of Senator Schweiker's proposals and initiated a change in its
procedures by OSHA Program Directive CPL 2.25B (Oct. 1, 1981) (available from
OSHA Office of Information and Consumer Affairs). In pertinent part, the gen-
eral schedule inspection procedures provide for the OSHA inspector to initially
examine an employer's injury-rate records. If it appears that the workplace injury
rate is below the most recently published Bureau of Labor Statistics on lost work-
day rates for that industry, the inspector will not conduct a further investigation
unless the injury data suggests a particular problem with a specific production
process or workplace area. See also Occupational Safety and Health Improvements
Acts of 1980, Hearings on S2153 Before the Commra on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980).
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issues raised in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co. 220 New OSHA pro-
cedures provide that employee complaint inspections in low hazard in-
dustries should be limited in scope unless the inspector observes serious
hazards or receives objective injury rate data which, after consulting
OSHA's area director, would justify an expanded inspection. 22'
In addition, court decisions can provide OSHA with direction and
guidance as to those inspection practices which are technically uncon-
stitutional but do not necessitate imposition of the exclusionary sanc-
tion.2 22 For example, the Supreme Court, in Wolf v. Colorado, 223
refused to expand the application of the exclusionary rule of Weeks v.
United States224 to the states because other potential sanctions, in the
form of civil damage actions and criminal penalties against law en-
forcement officials, were available.225 If a widespread pattern of abuse
and harassment emerges, then the judiciary may properly apply the ul-
timate sanctions of the exclusionary rule.
Undoubtedly there are those who will reject this argument on
grounds that it grants the employers the right to freedom from unrea-
sonable fourth amendment intrusions but "in reality . . . withhold[s]
its privilege and enjoyment. ' 226 The argument that courts should lend
guidance and direction to OSHA and permit the agency to rectify con-
stitutional errors without imposing the exclusionary sanction simply ac-
knowledges that the exclusionary rule is a judicial creation and that all
possible alternatives to it should be explored before courts impose it.
Since OSHA was granted a broad legislative objective to assure each
worker a workplace free of occupational health and safety hazards,
courts should be supportive of good faith attempts by the agency to
fulfill its mandate. Indeed, it can be argued that the provision of the
Act which authorizes warrantless inspections of workplaces was en-
acted by Congress based on its balancing of the respective interests at
stake.227 Congress resolved the conflict of competing interests by plac-
ing a higher priority on the discovery of health and safety violations
than on the protection of an employer's fourth amendment rights.228
220. 1981 O.S.H. DEC. (CCH) 31,527, aff'd, 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982).
221. See OSHA Instruction CPL 2.12B (Feb. 1, 1982) (available from OSHA Office of
Information and Consumer Affairs). As a practical point, changes in presidential
administrations often herald changes in OSHA inspection procedures.
222. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see also United States v. Wolffs, 594
F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979) (violation of statute did not warrant exclusion of evi-
dence absent widespread abuse of Act).
223. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
224. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
225. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-32 (1949); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creates a federal cause of action against federal
agents for constitutional violations). See generaly Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955).
226. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
227. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
228. "[I]t is important to note that warrantless civil inspections are both absolutely
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Although Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 229 held that Congress was incorrect
to the extent that it authorized warrantless searches, courts should ac-
cord great deference to the legislature's balancing of interests and pri-
ority setting in determining whether to apply a judicially-created
sanction to fourth amendment violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in
OSHA civil enforcement proceedings will undoubtedly reach the
Supreme Court for final resolution.23 ° Traditionally, standing to apply
the exclusionary rule has been carefully limited to situations where the
government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate victims of a
search in criminal proceedings. 3 ' Although the rule has been extended
to quasi-criminal proceedings, it is unclear whether OSHA proceedings
are quasi-criminal in character because they are designed to effectuate
remedial rather than punitive purposes.
In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule to OSHA civil
enforcement proceedings, the Supreme Court should weigh the privacy
interests of employers against the societal costs of suppressing relevant
and probative evidence which establishes dangerous health and safety
conditions in the workplace. It is suggested that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied in this context because employers possess a lesser
expectation of privacy than individuals in their person or residence.
Indeed, the important liberty interests involved in the criminal search
are not at stake in the context of an OSHA search. Moreover, applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule is premature. A mechanical application of
essential to this Act's enforcement and a long-standing federal practice." 123
CONG. REC. 325 (1977) (statement of Rep. Steiger, a principal sponsor of the Act).
229. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
230. While this article was in the process of publication, a conflict between the circuits
developed regarding the application of the exclusionary rule and the recognition
of a good faith exception in the context of OSHA proceedings. The Eleventh
Circuit, in Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982),
recently affirmed an OSHRC decision applying the exclusionary rule to OSHA
proceedings. While the court substantially adopted the reasoning and analysis of
OSHRC, it did hint that with regard to the good faith exception it preferred to
adopt a case-by-case approach. Id at 1072. Thus, the court felt that the facts of
Sarasota did not warrant use of the good faith exception because, "[iun essence,
OSHA officials decided to risk a questionable search and now expect to escape
responsibility by alleging good faith." Id
The Seventh Circuit, however, in Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting
Co., 695 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied en banc, Apr. 14, 1983, suggests
that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to OSHA proceedings. Moreover, the
court stated that even if the exclusionary rule is applicable to OSHA, a good faith
exception should be recognized.
Given the reluctance of the Supreme Court to impose the exclusionary sanc-
tion in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), and the growing emphasis on
excluding only that evidence which is seized as a result of flagrant or bad faith
police conduct, it would be reasonable to expect the Burger Court to decline ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule to OSHA proceedings.
231. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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the rule to the new and emerging fourth amendment problem of OSHA
inspections will not effectuate congressional intent to assure health and
safety in the American workplace. Rather, courts may resort to less
drastic means of deterring technical violations of the fourth amend-
ment,232 saving the ultimate sanction of the exclusionary rule for
flagrant violations.
If the Supreme Court ultimately decides to apply the exclusionary
rule to OSHA proceedings, it may best accomodate the competing in-
terests involved by utilizing the good faith exception as enunciated in
United States v. Williams. 233 If employers can establish a fourth
amendment violation, then the burden will be on OSHA officials to
demonstrate a good faith belief that they were acting within constitu-
tional bounds. Failure to shoulder this burden will result in the sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence.
Since its inception, the exclusionary rule has been the object of
debate within the legal community. The scope and application of the
rule have been narrowed to achieve the rule's primary objective of de-
terring police misconduct in the quest for criminal evidence. The costs
of applying the rule in criminal cases have been assailed by its critics
because "criminals go free when the constable blunders. 2 34 Unfortu-
nately, the costs of applying the rule in OSHA civil enforcement pro-
ceedings may be measured by the lives of American workers.
232. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creates a
federal cause of action against federal agents for constitutional violations).
233. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981).
234. See Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free (f the Constable Blunders;, 50 TEX. L. REV.
736 (1972).
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